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Life arose on Earth sometime in the first few hundred million years
after the young planet had cooled to the point that it could support
water-based organisms on its surface. The early emergence of life
on Earth has been taken as evidence that the probability of abiogen-
esis is high, if starting from young-Earth-like conditions. We revisit
this argument quantitatively in a Bayesian statistical framework. By
constructing a simple model of the probability of abiogenesis, we
calculate a Bayesian estimate of its posterior probability, given the
data that life emerged fairly early in Earth’s history and that, billions
of years later, curious creatures noted this fact and considered its
implications. We find that, given only this very limited empirical
information, the choice of Bayesian prior for the abiogenesis proba-
bility parameter has a dominant influence on the computed posterior
probability. Although terrestrial life’s early emergence provides evi-
dence that life might be common in the Universe if early-Earth-like
conditions are, the evidence is inconclusive and indeed is consistent
with an arbitrarily low intrinsic probability of abiogenesis for plausible
uninformative priors. Finding a single case of life arising indepen-
dently of our lineage (on Earth, elsewhere in the Solar System, or
on an extrasolar planet) would provide much stronger evidence that
abiogenesis is not extremely rare in the Universe.
Astrobiology
Abbreviations: Gyr, gigayear (109 years); PDF, probability density function; CDF,
cumulative distribution function
Introduction
Astrobiology is fundamentally concerned with whether ex-
traterrestrial life exists and, if so, how abundant it is in the
Universe. The most direct and promising approach to answer-
ing these questions is surely empirical, the search for life on
other bodies in the Solar System [1, 2] and beyond in other
planetary systems [3, 4]. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach
is possible in principle and could provide a useful complement
to the more direct lines of investigation.
In particular, if we knew the probability per unit time
and per unit volume of abiogenesis in a pre-biotic environ-
ment as a function of its physical and chemical conditions
and if we could determine or estimate the prevalence of such
environments in the Universe, we could make a statistical esti-
mate of the abundance of extraterrestrial life. This relatively
straightforward approach is, of course, thwarted by our great
ignorance regarding both inputs to the argument at present.
There does, however, appear to be one possible way of fi-
nessing our lack of detailed knowledge concerning both the
process of abiogenesis and the occurrence of suitable pre-
biotic environments (whatever they might be) in the Universe.
Namely, we can try to use our knowledge that life arose at least
once in an environment (whatever it was) on the early Earth
to try to infer something about the probability per unit time
of abiogenesis on an Earth-like planet without the need (or
ability) to say how Earth-like it need be or in what ways. We
will hereinafter refer to this probability per unit time, which
can also be considered a rate, as λ or simply the “probability
of abiogenesis.”
Any inferences about the probability of life arising (given
the conditions present on the early Earth) must be informed
by how long it took for the first living creatures to evolve. By
definition, improbable events generally happen infrequently.
It follows that the duration between events provides a metric
(however imperfect) of the probability or rate of the events.
The time-span between when Earth achieved pre-biotic condi-
tions suitable for abiogenesis plus generally habitable climatic
conditions [5, 6, 7] and when life first arose, therefore, seems
to serve as a basis for estimating λ. Revisiting and quantifying
this analysis is the subject of this paper.
We note several previous quantitative attempts to address
this issue in the literature, of which one [8] found, as we
do, that early abiogenesis is consistent with life being rare,
and the other [9] found that Earth’s early abiogenesis points
strongly to life being common on Earth-like planets (we com-
pare our approach to the problem to that of [9] below, in-
cluding our significantly different results).1 Furthermore, an
argument of this general sort has been widely used in a qual-
itative and even intuitive way to conclude that λ is unlikely
to be extremely small because it would then be surprising for
abiogenesis to have occurred as quickly as it did on Earth
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Indeed, the early emergence of life
on Earth is often taken as significant supporting evidence for
“optimism” about the existence of extra-terrestrial life (i.e.,
for the view that it is fairly common) [19, 20, 9]. The major
motivation of this paper is to determine the quantitative va-
lidity of this inference. We emphasize that our goal is not to
derive an optimum estimate of λ based on all of the many lines
of available evidence, but simply to evaluate the implication
of life’s early emergence on Earth for the value of λ.
A Bayesian Formulation of the Calculation
Bayes’s theorem [21] can be written as P[M|D] =
(P[D|M]× Pprior[M]) /P[D]. Here, we takeM to be a model
and D to be data. In order to use this equation to evalu-
ate the posterior probability of abiogenesis, we must specify
appropriate M and D.
†dave@ias.edu
Reserved for Publication Footnotes
1There are two unpublished works ([10] and [11]), of which we became aware after submission
of this paper, that also conclude that early life on Earth does not rule out the possibility that
abiogenesis is improbable.
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A Poisson or Uniform Rate Model. In considering the devel-
opment of life on a planet, we suggest that a reasonable, if
simplistic, model is that it is a Poisson process during a pe-
riod of time from tmin until tmax. In this model, the conditions
on a young planet preclude the development of life for a time
period of tmin after its formation. Furthermore, if the planet
remains lifeless until tmax has elapsed, it will remain lifeless
thereafter as well because conditions no longer permit life to
arise. For a planet around a solar-type star, tmax is almost
certainly ∼< 10 Gyr (10 billion years, the main sequence life-
time of the Sun) and could easily be a substantially shorter
period of time if there is something about the conditions on
a young planet that are necessary for abiogenesis. Between
these limiting times, we posit that there is a certain probabil-
ity per unit time (λ) of life developing. For tmin < t < tmax,
then, the probability of life arising n times in time t is
P[λ, n, t] = PPoisson[λ, n, t] = e
−λ(t−tmin) {λ(t− tmin)}n
n!
,
[1]
where t is the time since the formation of the planet.
This formulation could well be questioned on a number of
grounds. Perhaps most fundamentally, it treats abiogenesis
as though it were a single instantaneous event and implicitly
assumes that it can occur in only a single way (i.e., by only a
single process or mechanism) and only in one type of physical
environment. It is, of course, far more plausible that abiogen-
esis is actually the result of a complex chain of events that
take place over some substantial period of time and perhaps
via different pathways and in different environments. How-
ever, knowledge of the actual origin of life on Earth, to say
nothing of other possible ways in which it might originate, is
so limited that a more complex model is not yet justified. In
essence, the simple Poisson event model used in this paper
attempts to “integrate out” all such details and treat abio-
genesis as a “black box” process: certain chemical and phys-
ical conditions as input produce a certain probability of life
emerging as an output. Another issue is that λ, the probabil-
ity per unit time, could itself be a function of time. In fact,
the claim that life could not have arisen outside the window
(tmin, tmax) is tantamount to saying that λ = 0 for t ≤ tmin
and for t ≥ tmax. Instead of switching from 0 to a fixed value
instantaneously, λ could exhibit a complicated variation with
time. If so, however, P[λ, n, t] is not represented by the Pois-
son distribution and eq. (1) is not valid. Unless a particular
(non top-hat-function) time-variation of λ is suggested on the-
oretical grounds, it seems unwise to add such unconstrained
complexity.
A further criticism is that λ could be a function of n: it
could be that life arising once (or more) changes the probabil-
ity per unit time of life arising again. Since we are primarily
interested in the probability of life arising at all – i.e., the
probability of n 6= 0 – we can define λ simply to be the value
appropriate for a prebiotic planet (whatever that value may
be) and remain agnostic as to whether it differs for n ≥ 1.
Thus, within the adopted model, the probability of life aris-
ing is one minus the probability of it not arising:
Plife = 1− PPoisson[λ, 0, t] = 1− e−λ(t−tmin) . [2]
A Minimum Evolutionary Time Constraint. Naively, the single
datum informing our calculation of the posterior of λ appears
to be simply that life arose on Earth at least once, approxi-
mately 3.8 billion years ago (give or take a few hundred million
years). There is additional significant context for this datum,
however. Recall that the standard claim is that, since life
arose early on the only habitable planet that we have exam-
ined for inhabitants, the probability of abiogenesis is proba-
Models of t0 = 4.5 Gyr-Old Planets
Model Hypothetical Conserv.1 Conserv.2 Optimistic
tmin 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
temerge 0.51 1.3 1.3 0.7
tmax 10 1.4 10 10
δtevolve 1 2 3.1 1
trequired 3.5 1.4 1.4 3.5
∆t1 0.01 0.80 0.80 0.20
∆t2 3.00 0.90 0.90 3.00
R 300 1.1 1.1 15
All times are in Gyr. Two “Conservative” (Conserv.) models are
shown, to indicate that trequired may be limited either by a small
value of tmax (“Conserv.1”), or by a large value of δtevolve
(“Conserv.2”).
bly high (in our language, λ is probably large). This stan-
dard argument neglects a potentially important selection ef-
fect, namely: On Earth, it took nearly 4 Gyr for evolution to
lead to organisms capable of pondering the probability of life
elsewhere in the Universe. If this is a necessary duration, then
it would be impossible for us to find ourselves on, for example,
a (∼4.5-Gyr old) planet on which life first arose only after the
passage of 3.5 billion years [22]. On such planets there would
not yet have been enough time for creatures capable of such
contemplations to evolve. In other words, if evolution requires
3.5 Gyr for life to evolve from the simplest forms to intelligent,
questioning beings, then we had to find ourselves on a planet
where life arose relatively early, regardless of the value of λ.
In order to introduce this constraint into the calculation
we define δtevolve as the minimum amount of time required af-
ter the emergence of life for cosmologically curious creatures
to evolve, temerge as the age of the Earth from when the earliest
extant evidence of life remains (though life might have actu-
ally emerged earlier), and t0 as the current age of the Earth.
The data, then, are that life arose on Earth at least once, ap-
proximately 3.8 billion years ago, and that this emergence was
early enough that human beings had the opportunity subse-
quently to evolve and to wonder about their origins and the
possibility of life elsewhere in the Universe. In equation form,
temerge < t0 − δtevolve.
The Likelihood Term. We now seek to evaluate the P[D|M]
term in Bayes’s theorem. Let trequired ≡ min[t0 −
δtevolve, tmax]. Our existence on Earth requires that life ap-
peared within trequired. In other words, trequired is the max-
imum age that the Earth could have had at the origin of
life in order for humanity to have a chance of showing up
by the present. We define SE to be the set of all Earth-like
worlds of age approximately t0 in a large, unbiased volume
and L[t] to be the subset of SE on which life has emerged
within a time t. L[trequired] is the set of planets on which
life emerged early enough that creatures curious about abio-
genesis could have evolved before the present (t0), and, pre-
suming temerge < trequired (which we know was the case for
Earth), L[temerge] is the subset of L[trequired] on which life
emerged as quickly as it did on Earth. Correspondingly, NSE ,
Ntr , and Nte are the respective numbers of planets in sets
SE , L[trequired], and L[temerge]. The fractions ϕtr ≡ Ntr/NSE
2An alternative way to derive equation (3) is to let E = “abiogenesis occurred between tmin and
temerge” and R = “abiogenesis occurred between tmin and trequired.” We then have, from
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and ϕte ≡ Nte/NSE are, respectively, the fraction of Earth-
like planets on which life arose within trequired and the frac-
tion on which life emerged within temerge. The ratio r ≡
ϕte/ϕtr = Nte/Ntr is the fraction of Ltr on which life arose
as soon as it did on Earth. Given that we had to find our-
selves on such a planet in the set Ltr in order to write and
read about this topic, the ratio r characterizes the probability
of the data given the model if the probability of intelligent
observers arising is independent of the time of abiogenesis
(so long as abiogenesis occurs before trequired). (This last as-
sumption might seem strange or unwarranted, but the effect
of relaxing this assumption is to make it more likely that we
would find ourselves on a planet with early abiogenesis and
therefore to reduce our limited ability to infer anything about
λ from our observations.) Since ϕte = 1−PPoisson[λ, 0, temerge]
and ϕtr = 1− PPoisson[λ, 0, trequired], we may write that
P[D|M] = 1− exp[−λ(temerge − tmin)]
1− exp[−λ(trequired − tmin)] [3]
if tmin < temerge < trequired (and P[D|M] = 0 otherwise). This
is called the “likelihood function,” and represents the proba-
bility of the observation(s), given a particular model.2 It is
via this function that the data “condition” our prior beliefs
about λ in standard Bayesian terminology.
Limiting Behavior of the Likelihood. It is instructive to con-
sider the behavior of equation (3) in some interesting limits.
For λ(trequired − tmin)  1, the numerator and denominator
of equation (3) each go approximately as the argument of the
exponential function; therefore, in this limit, the likelihood
function is approximately constant:
P[D|M] ≈ temerge − tmin
trequired − tmin . [4]
This result is intuitively easy to understand as follows: If λ
is sufficiently small, it is overwhelmingly likely that abiogene-
sis occurred only once in the history of the Earth, and by the
assumptions of our model, the one event is equally likely to oc-
cur at any time during the interval between tmin and trequired.
The chance that this will occur by temerge is then just the
fraction of that total interval that has passed by temerge – the
result given in equation (4).
In the other limit, when λ(temerge− tmin) 1, the numer-
ator and denominator of equation (3) are both approximately
1. In this case, the likelihood function is also approximately
constant (and equal to unity). This result is even more in-
tuitively obvious since a very large value of λ implies that
abiogenesis events occur at a high rate (given suitable condi-
tions) and are thus likely to have occurred very early in the
interval between tmin and trequired.
These two limiting cases, then, already reveal a key con-
clusion of our analysis: the posterior distribution of λ for
both very large and very small values will have the shape of
the prior, just scaled by different constants. Only when λ is
neither very large nor very small – or, more precisely, when
λ(temerge − tmin) ≈ 1 – do the data and the prior both inform
the posterior probability at a roughly equal level.
The Bayes Factor. In this context, note that the probabil-
ity in equation (3) depends crucially on two time differences,
∆t1 ≡ temerge − tmin and ∆t2 ≡ trequired − tmin, and that the
ratio of the likelihood function at large λ to its value at small
λ goes roughly as
R ≡ P[data|largeλ]
P[data|smallλ] ≈
∆t2
∆t1
. [5]
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Fig. 1. PDF and CDF of λ for uniform, logarithmic, and inverse-
uniform priors, for model Optimistic, with λmin = 10
−3Gyr−1
and λmax = 103Gyr−1. Top: The dashed and solid curves repre-
sent, respectively, the prior and posterior probability distribution
functions (PDFs) of λ under three different assumptions about the
nature of the prior. The green curves are for a prior that is uniform
on the range 0Gyr−1 ≤ λ ≤ λmax (“Uniform”); the blue are for a
prior that is uniform in the log of λ on the range −3 ≤ log λ ≤ 3
(“Log (-3)”); and the red are for a prior that is uniform in λ−1 on
the interval 10−3Gyr ≤ λ−1 ≤ 103Gyr (“InvUnif (-3)”). Bottom:
The curves represent the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
of λ. The ordinate on each curve represents the integrated probabil-
ity from 0 to the abscissa (color and line-style schemes are the same
as in the top panel). For a uniform prior, the posterior CDF traces
the prior almost exactly. In this case, the posterior judgment that
λ is probably large simply reflects the prior judgment of the dis-
tribution of λ. For the prior that is uniform in λ−1 (InvUnif), the
posterior judgment is quite opposite – namely, that λ is probably
quite small – but this judgment is also foretold by the prior, which
is traced nearly exactly by the posterior. For the logarithmic prior,
the datum (that life on Earth arose within a certain time window)
does influence the posterior assessment of λ, shifting it in the di-
rection of making greater values of λ more probable. Nevertheless,
the posterior probability is ∼12% that λ < 1Gyr−1. Lower λmin
and/or lower λmax would further increase the posterior probability
of very low λ, for any of the priors.
R is called the Bayes factor or Bayes ratio and is sometimes
employed for model selection purposes. In one conventional
interpretation [23], R ≤ 10 implies no strong reason in the
the rules of conditional probability, P[E|R,M] = P[E,R|M]/P[R|M]. Since E entails R,
the numerator on the right-hand side is simply equal to P[E|M], which means that the previous
equation reduces to equation (3).
3[24] advances this claim based on theoretical arguments that are critically reevaluated in [25]
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data alone to prefer the model in the numerator over the one
in the denominator. For the problem at hand, this means that
the datum does not justify preference for a large value of λ
over an arbitrarily small one unless equation (5) gives a result
larger than roughly ten.
Since the likelihood function contains all of the informa-
tion in the data and since the Bayes factor has the limiting
behavior given in equation 5, our analysis in principle need
not consider priors. If a small value of λ is to be decisively
ruled out by the data, the value of R must be much larger
than unity. It is not for plausible choices of the parameters
(see Table 1), and thus arbitrarily small values of λ can only
be excluded by some adopted prior on its values. Still, for
illustrative purposes, we now proceed to demonstrate the in-
fluence of various possible λ priors on the λ posterior.
The Prior Term. To compute the desired posterior probability,
what remains to be specified is Pprior[M], the prior joint prob-
ability density function (PDF) of λ, tmin, tmax, and δtevolve.
One approach to choosing appropriate priors for tmin, tmax,
and δtevolve, would be to try to distill geophysical and pale-
obiological evidence along with theories for the evolution of
intelligence and the origin of life into quantitative distribution
functions that accurately represent prior information and be-
liefs about these parameters. Then, in order to ultimately
calculate a posterior distribution of λ, one would marginalize
over these “nuisance parameters.” However, since our goal
is to evaluate the influence of life’s early emergence on our
posterior judgment of λ (and not of the other parameters),
we instead adopt a different approach. Rather than calculat-
ing a posterior over this 4-dimensional parameter space, we
investigate the way these three time parameters affect our in-
ferences regarding λ by simply taking their priors to be delta
functions at several theoretically interesting values: a purely
hypothetical situation in which life arose extremely quickly,
a most conservative situation, and an in between case that is
also optimistic but for which there does exist some evidence
(see Table 1).
For the values in Table 1, the likelihood ratio R varies
from ∼1.1 to 300, with the parameters of the “optimistic”
model giving a borderline significance value of R = 15. Thus,
only the hypothetical case gives a decisive preference for large
λ by the Bayes factor metric, and we emphasize that there
is no direct evidence that abiogenesis on Earth occurred that
early, only 10 million years after conditions first permitted it!3
We also lack a first-principles theory or other solid prior
information for λ. We therefore take three different functional
forms for the prior – uniform in λ, uniform in λ−1 (equivalent
to saying that the mean time until life appears is uniformly
distributed), and uniform in log10 λ. For the uniform in λ
prior, we take our prior confidence in λ to be uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval 0 to λmax = 1000 Gyr
−1 (and to
be 0 otherwise). For the uniform in λ−1 and the uniform in
log10[λ] priors, we take the prior density functions for λ
−1
and log10[λ], respectively, to be uniform on λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax
(and 0 otherwise). For illustrative purposes, we take three
values of λmin: 10
−22Gyr−1, 10−11Gyr−1, and 10−3Gyr−1,
corresponding roughly to life occuring once in the observable
Universe, once in our galaxy, and once per 200 stars (assuming
one Earth-like planet per star).
In standard Bayesian terminology, both the uniform in λ
and the uniform in λ−1 priors are said to be highly “informa-
tive.” This means that they strongly favor large and small,
respectively, values of λ in advance, i.e., on some basis other
than the empirical evidence represented by the likelihood term.
For example, the uniform in λ prior asserts that we know on
some other basis (other than the early emergence of life on
Earth) that it is a hundred times less likely that λ is less than
10−3Gyr−1 than that it is less than 0.1Gyr−1. The uniform
in λ−1 prior has the equivalent sort of preference for small λ
values. By contrast, the logarithmic prior is relatively “unin-
formative” in standard Bayesian terminology and is equivalent
to asserting that we have no prior information that informs
us of even the order-of-magnitude of λ.
In our opinion, the logarithmic prior is the most appropri-
ate one given our current lack of knowledge of the process(es)
of abiogenesis, as it represents scale-invariant ignorance of the
value of λ. It is, nevertheless, instructive to carry all three pri-
ors through the calculation of the posterior distribution of λ,
because they vividly illuminate the extent to which the result
depends on the data vs the assumed prior.
Comparison with Previous Analysis. Using a binomial proba-
bility analysis, Lineweaver & Davis [9] attempted to quantify
q, the probability that life would arise within the first billion
years on an Earth-like planet. Although the binomial distri-
bution typically applies to discrete situations (in contrast to
the continuous passage of time, during which life might arise),
there is a simple correspondence between their analysis and
the Poisson model described above. The probability that life
would arise at least once within a billion years (what [9] call
q) is a simple transformation of λ, obtained from equation (2),
with ∆t1 = 1 Gyr:
q = 1− e−(λ)(1Gyr) or λ = ln[1− q]/(1Gyr) . [6]
In the limit of λ(1Gyr)  1, equation (6) implies that q
is equal to λ(1Gyr). Though not cast in Bayesian terms, the
analysis in [9] draws a Bayesian conclusion and therefore is
based on an implicit prior that is uniform in q. As a result, it
is equivalent to our uniform-λ prior for small values of λ (or
q), and it is this implicit prior, not the early emergence of life
on Earth, that dominates their conclusions.
The Posterior Probability of Abiogenesis
We compute the normalized product of the probability of the
data given λ (equation 3) with each of the three priors (uni-
form, logarithmic, and inverse uniform). This gives us the
Bayesian posterior PDF of λ, which we also derive for each
model in Table 1. Then, by integrating each PDF from −∞ to
λ, we obtain the corresponding cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF).
Figure 1 displays the results by plotting the prior and
posterior probability of λ. The top panel presents the PDF,
and the bottom panel the CDF, for uniform, logarithmic, and
inverse-uniform priors, for model Optimistic, which sets ∆t1
(the maximum time it might have taken life to emerge once
Earth became habitable) to 0.2 Gyr, and ∆t2 (the time life
had available to emerge in order that intelligent creatures
would have a chance to evolve) to 3.0 Gyr. The dashed
and solid curves represent, respectively, prior and posterior
probability functions. In this figure, the priors on λ have
λmin = 10
−3Gyr−1 and λmax = 103Gyr−1. The green, blue,
and red curves are calculated for uniform, logarithmic, and
inverse-uniform priors, respectively. The results of the corre-
sponding calculations for the other models and bounds on the
assumed priors are presented in the Supporting Information,
but the cases shown in Fig. 1 suffice to demonstrate all of the
important qualitative behaviors of the posterior.
In the plot of differential probability (PDF; top panel), it
appears that the inferred posterior probabilities of different
values of λ are conditioned similarly by the data (leading to
4 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 Spiegel & Turner
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Fig. 2. CDF of λ for abiogenesis with independent lineage, for logarithmic prior.
λmin = 10
−3Gyr−1, λmax = 103Gyr−1. A discovery that life arose inde-
pendently on Mars and Earth or on an exoplanet and Earth – or that it arose a second,
independent, time on Earth – would significantly reduce the posterior probability of
low λ.
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a jump in the posterior PDF of roughly an order of magni-
tude in the vicinity of λ ∼ 0.5 Gyr−1). The plot of cumulative
probability, however, immediately shows that the uniform and
the inverse priors produce posterior CDFs that are completely
insensitive to the data. Namely, small values of λ are strongly
excluded in the uniform in λ prior case and large values are
equally strongly excluded by the uniform in λ−1 prior, but
these strong conclusions are not a consequence of the data,
only of the assumed prior. This point is particularly salient,
given that a Bayesian interpretation of [9] indicates an im-
plicit uniform prior. In other words, their conclusion that q
cannot be too small and thus that life should not be too rare
in the Universe is not a consequence of the evidence of the
early emergence of life on the Earth but almost only of their
particular parameterization of the problem.
For the Optimistic parameters, the posterior CDF com-
puted with the uninformative logarithmic prior does reflect
the influence of the data, making greater values of λ more
probable in accordance with one’s intuitive expectations.
However, with this relatively uninformative prior, there is a
significant probability that λ is very small (12% chance that
λ < 1Gyr−1). Moreover, if we adopted smaller λmin, smaller
λmax, and/or a larger ∆t1/∆t2 ratio, the posterior probability
of an arbitrarily low λ value can be made acceptably high (see
Fig. 3 and the Supporting Information).
Independent Abiogenesis. We have no strong evidence that
life ever arose on Mars (although no strong evidence to the
contrary either). Recent observations have tenatively sug-
gested the presence of methane at the level of ∼20 parts per
billion (ppb) [26], which could potentially be indicative of bi-
ological activity. The case is not entirely clear, however, as
alternative analysis of the same data suggests that an upper
limit to the methane abundance is in the vicinity of ∼3 ppb
[27]. If, in the future, researchers find compelling evidence
that Mars or an exoplanet hosts life that arose independently
of life on Earth (or that life arose on Earth a second, inde-
pendent time [28, 29]), how would this affect the posterior
probability density of λ (assuming that the same λ holds for
both instances of abiogenesis)?
If Mars, for instance, and Earth share a single λ and life
arose arise on Mars, then the likelihood of Mars’ λ is the joint
probability of our data on Earth and of life arising on Mars.
Assuming no panspermia in either direction, these events are
independent:
P[D|M] =
(
1− exp[−λ(tMarsemerge − tMarsmin )]
)
× 1− exp[−λ(t
Earth
emerge − tEarthmin )]
1− exp[−λ(tEarthrequired − tEarthmin )]
. [7]
For Mars, we take tMarsmax = t
Mars
emerge = 1 Gyr and t
Mars
min =
0.5 Gyr. The posterior cumulative probability distribution
of λ, given a logarithmic prior between 0.001 Gyr−1 and
1000 Gyr−1, is as represented in Fig. 2 for the case of find-
ing a second, independent sample of life and, for compari-
son, the Optimistic case for Earth. Should future researchers
find that life arose independently on Mars (or elsewhere), this
would dramatically reduce the posterior probability of very
low λ relative to our current inferences.
Arbitrarily Low Posterior Probability of λ. We do not actu-
ally know what the appropriate lower (or upper) bounds on
λ are. Figure 3 portrays the influence of changing λmin on
the median posterior estimate of λ, and on 1-σ and 2-σ confi-
dence lower bounds on posterior estimates of λ. Although the
median estimate is relatvely insensitive to λmin, a 2-σ lower
bound on λ becomes arbitrarily low as λmin decreases.
Conclusions
Within a few hundred million years, and perhaps far more
quickly, of the time that Earth became a hospitable location
for life, it transitioned from being merely habitable to being
inhabited. Recent rapid progress in exoplanet science sug-
gests that habitable worlds might be extremely common in
our galaxy [30, 31, 32, 33], which invites the question of how
often life arises, given habitable conditions. Although this
question ultimately must be answered empirically, via searches
for biomarkers [34] or for signs of extraterrestrial technology
[35], the early emergence of life on Earth gives us some infor-
mation about the probability that abiogenesis will result from
early-Earth-like conditions.4
A Bayesian approach to estimating the probability of abio-
genesis clarifies the relative influence of data and of our prior
4We note that the comparatively very late emergence of radio technology on Earth could, anal-
ogously, be taken as an indication (albeit a weak one because of our single datum) that radio
technology might be rare in our galaxy.
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beliefs. Although a “best guess” of the probability of abio-
genesis suggests that life should be common in the Galaxy
if early-Earth-like conditions are, still, the data are consis-
tent (under plausible priors) with life being extremely rare, as
shown in Figure 3. Thus, a Bayesian enthusiast of extrater-
restrial life should be significantly encouraged by the rapid
appearance of life on the early Earth but cannot be highly
confident on that basis.
Our conclusion that the early emergence of life on Earth
is consistent with life being very rare in the Universe for plau-
sible priors is robust against two of the more fundamental
simplifications in our formal analysis. First, we have assumed
that there is a single value of λ that applies to all Earth-like
planets (without specifying exactly what we mean by “Earth-
like”). If λ actually varies from planet to planet, as seems
far more plausible, anthropic-like considerations imply plan-
ets with particularly large λ values will have a greater chance
of producing (intelligent) life and of life appearing relatively
rapidly, i.e., of the circumstances in which we find ourselves.
Thus, the information we derive about λ from the existence
and early appearance of life on Earth will tend to be biased
towards large values and may not be representative of the
value of λ for, say, an “average” terrestrial planet orbiting
within the habitable zone of a main sequence star. Second,
our formulation of the problem analyzed in this paper im-
plicitly assumes that there is no increase in the probability
of intelligent life appearing once δtevolve has elapsed following
the abiogenesis event on a planet. A more reasonable model
in which this probability continues to increase as additional
time passes would have the same qualitative effect on the cal-
culation as increasing δtevolve. In other words, it would make
the resulting posterior distribution of λ even less sensitive to
the data and more highly dependent on the prior because it
would make our presence on Earth a selection bias favoring
planets on which abiogenesis occurred quickly.
We had to find ourselves on a planet that has life on it,
but we did not have to find ourselves (i) in a galaxy that has
life on a planet besides Earth nor (ii) on a planet on which
life arose multiple, independent times. Learning that either
(i) or (ii) describes our world would constitute data that are
not subject to the selection effect described above. In short, if
we should find evidence of life that arose wholly idependently
of us – either via astronomical searches that reveal life on an-
other planet or via geological and biological studies that find
evidence of life on Earth with a different origin from us – we
would have considerably stronger grounds to conclude that
life is probably common in our galaxy. With this in mind,
research in the fields of astrobiology and origin of life stud-
ies might, in the near future, help us to significantly refine
our estimate of the probability (per unit time, per Earth-like
planet) of abiogenesis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Adam Brown, Adam Burrows, Chris Chyba,
Scott Gaudi, Aaron Goldman, Alan Guth, Larry Guth, Laura Landweber, Tullis On-
stott, Caleb Scharf, Stanley Spiegel, Josh Winn, and Neil Zimmerman for thoughtful
discussions. ELT is grateful to Carl Boettiger for calling this problem to his atten-
tion some years ago. DSS acknowledges support from NASA grant NNX07AG80G,
from JPL/Spitzer Agreements 1328092, 1348668, and 1312647, and gratefully ac-
knowledges support from NSF grant AST-0807444 and the Keck Fellowship. ELT
gratefully acknowledges support from the World Premier International Research Cen-
ter Initiative (Kavli-IPMU), MEXT, Japan and the Research Center for the Early
Universe at the University of Tokyo as well as the hospitality of its Department of
Physics. Finally, we thank two anonymous referees for comments that materially
improved this manuscript.
1. Chyba, C. F. & Hand, K. P. ASTROBIOLOGY: The Study of the Living Universe.
Ann. Rev. Astr. Ap. 43, 31–74 (2005).
2. Des Marais, D. & Walter, M. Astrobiology: exploring the origins, evolution, and dis-
tribution of life in the universe. Annual review of ecology and systematics 397–420
(1999).
3. Des Marais, D. J. et al. Remote Sensing of Planetary Properties and Biosignatures
on Extrasolar Terrestrial Planets. Astrobiology 2, 153–181 (2002).
4. Seager, S., Turner, E. L., Schafer, J. & Ford, E. B. Vegetation’s Red Edge: A Pos-
sible Spectroscopic Biosignature of Extraterrestrial Plants. Astrobiology 5, 372–390
(2005). arXiv:astro-ph/0503302.
5. Kasting, J. F., Whitmire, D. P. & Reynolds, R. T. Habitable Zones around Main
Sequence Stars. Icarus 101, 108–128 (1993).
6. Selsis, F. et al. Habitable planets around the star Gliese 581? Astron. Astrophys. 476,
1373–1387 (2007). arXiv:0710.5294.
7. Spiegel, D. S., Menou, K. & Scharf, C. A. Habitable Climates. Astrophys. J. 681,
1609–1623 (2008). arXiv:0711.4856.
8. Carter, B. The Anthropic Principle and its Implications for Biological Evolution. Royal
Society of London Philosophical Transactions Series A 310, 347–363 (1983).
9. Lineweaver, C. H. & Davis, T. M. Does the Rapid Appearance of Life on Earth
Suggest that Life Is Common in the Universe? Astrobiology 2, 293–304 (2002).
arXiv:astro-ph/0205014.
10. Brewer, B. J. The Implications of the Early Formation of Life on Earth. ArXiv e-prints
(2008). 0807.4969.
11. Korpela, E. J. Statistics of One: What Earth Can and Can’t Tell us About Life in the
Universe. viXra:1108.0003 (2011). 1108.0003.
12. van Zuilen, M. A., Lepland, A. & Arrhenius, G. Reassessing the evidence for the
earliest traces of life. Nat. 418, 627–630 (2002).
13. Westall, F. Early life on earth: the ancient fossil record. Astrobiology: Future Per-
spectives 287–316 (2005).
14. Moorbath, S. Oldest rocks, earliest life, heaviest impacts, and the hadea archaean
transition. Applied Geochemistry 20, 819–824 (2005).
15. Nutman, A. & Friend, C. Petrography and geochemistry of apatites in banded iron
formation, akilia, w. greenland: Consequences for oldest life evidence. Precambrian
Research 147, 100–106 (2006).
16. Buick, R. The earliest records of life on Earth. In Sullivan, W. T. & Baross, J. A.
(eds.) Planets and life: the emerging science of astrobiology (Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
17. Sullivan, W. & Baross, J. Planets and life: the emerging science of astrobiology
(Cambridge University Press, 2007).
18. Sugitani, K. et al. Biogenicity of Morphologically Diverse Carbonaceous Microstruc-
tures from the ca. 3400 Ma Strelley Pool Formation, in the Pilbara Craton, Western
Australia. Astrobiology 10, 899–920 (2010).
19. Ward, P. & Brownlee, D. Rare earth : why complex life is uncommon in the universe
(2000).
20. Darling, D. Life everywhere (Basic Books, 2001).
21. Bayes, M. & Price, M. An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances.
by the late rev. mr. bayes, frs communicated by mr. price, in a letter to john canton,
amfrs. Philosophical Transactions 53, 370 (1763).
22. Lineweaver, C. H. & Davis, T. M. On the Nonobservability of Recent Biogenesis.
Astrobiology 3, 241–243 (2003). arXiv:astro-ph/0305122.
23. Jeffreys, H. Theory of probability (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961).
24. Lazcano, A. & Miller, S. How long did it take for life to begin and evolve to cyanobac-
teria? Journal of Molecular Evolution 39, 546–554 (1994).
25. Orgel, L. The origin of life–how long did it take? Origins of Life and Evolution of
Biospheres 28, 91–96 (1998).
26. Mumma, M. J. et al. Strong Release of Methane on Mars in Northern Summer 2003.
Science 323, 1041– (2009).
27. Zahnle, K., Freedman, R. S. & Catling, D. C. Is there methane on Mars? Icarus 212,
493–503 (2011).
28. Davies, P. C. W. & Lineweaver, C. H. Finding a Second Sample of Life on Earth.
Astrobiology 5, 154–163 (2005).
29. Davies, P. C. W. et al. Signatures of a Shadow Biosphere. Astrobiology 9, 241–249
(2009).
30. Vogt, S. S. et al. The Lick-Carnegie Exoplanet Survey: A 3.1 MEarth Planet in
the Habitable Zone of the Nearby M3V Star Gliese 581. Astrophys. J. 723, 954–965
(2010).
31. Borucki, W. J. et al. Characteristics of Planetary Candidates Observed by Kepler. II.
Analysis of the First Four Months of Data. Astrophys. J. 736, 19 (2011). 1102.0541.
32. Howard, A. W. et al. Planet Occurrence within 0.25 AU of Solar-type Stars from
Kepler. ArXiv e-prints (2011). 1103.2541.
33. Wordsworth, R. D. et al. Gliese 581d is the First Discovered Terrestrial-mass Exoplanet
in the Habitable Zone. Astrophys. J. Lett. 733, L48+ (2011). 1105.1031.
34. Kaltenegger, L. & Selsis, F. Biomarkers set in context. ArXiv e-prints 0710.0881
(2007). 0710.0881.
35. Tarter, J. The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). Ann. Rev. Astr. Ap. 39,
511–548 (2001).
6 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 Spiegel & Turner
Spiegel & Turner PNAS Issue Date Volume Issue Number 7
Supplementary Material
Formal Derivation of the Posterior Probability of Abiogenesis Let ta be the time of abiogenesis and ti be the time of the
emergence of intelligence (t0, temerge, and trequired are as defined in the text: t0 is the current age of the Earth; temerge is the
upper limit on the age of the Earth when life first arose; and trequired is the maximum age the Earth could have had when life
arose in order for it to be possible for sentient beings to later arise by t0). By “intelligence”, we mean organisms that think
about abiogenesis. Furthermore, let
E = tmin < ta < temerge
R = tmin < ta < trequired
I = tmin < ti ≤ t0
M = “The Poisson rate parameter has value λ′′
We assert (perhaps somewhat unreasonably) that the probability of intelligence arising (I) is independent of the actual
time of abiogeneis (ta), so long as life shows up within trequired (R).
P[I|R,M, ta] = P[I|R,M] . [8]
Although the probability of intelligence arising could very well be greater if abiogenesis occurs earlier on a world, the conse-
quence of relaxing this assertion (discussed in the Conclusion and elsewhere in the text) is to increase the posterior probability
of arbitrarily low λ.
Using the conditional version of Bayes’s theorem,
P[ta|R,M, I] = P[I|R,M, ta]× P[ta|R,M]
P[I|R,M] , [9]
and Eq. (8) then implies that P[ta|R,M, I] = P[ta|R,M]. An immediate result of this is that
P[E|R,M, I] = P[E|R,M] . [10]
We now apply Bayes’s theorem again to get the posterior probability of λ, given our circumstances and our observations:
P[M|E,R, I] = P[E|R,M, I]× P[M|R, I]
P[E,R, I]
[11]
Note that, since te < tr, E ⇒ R. And, as discussed in the main text, P[E|R,M] = P[E|M]/P[R|M]. Finally, since we had
to find ourselves on a planet on which R and I hold, these conditions tell us nothing about the value of λ. In other words,
P[M|R, I] = P[M]. We therefore use Eq. (10) to rewrite Eq. (11) as the posterior probability implied in the text:
P[M|E, I] =
P[E|M]
P[R|M] × P[M]
P[E, I]
. [12]
Model-Dependence of Posterior Probability of Abiogenesis In the main text, we demonstrated the strong dependence of the
posterior probability of life on the form of the prior for λ. Here, we present a suite of additional calculations, for different
bounds to λ and for different values of ∆t1 and ∆t2.
Figure 4 displays the results of analogous calculations to those of Fig. 1, for three sets model of parameters (Hypothetical,
Optimistic, Conservative) and for three values of λmin (10
−22Gyr−1, 10−11Gyr−1, 10−3Gyr−1). For all three models, the
posterior CDFs for the uniform and the inverse-uniform priors almost exactly match the prior CDFs, and, hence, are almost
completely insensitive to the data. For the Conservative model (in which ∆t1 = 0.8 Gyr and ∆t2 = 0.9 Gyr – certainly not
ruled out by available data), even the logarithmic prior’s CDF is barely sensitive to the observation that there is life on Earth.
Finally, the effect of δtevolve – the minimum timescale required for sentience to evolve – is to impose a selection effect that
becomes progressively more severe as δtevolve approaches t0 − temerge. Figure 5 makes this point vividly. For the Optimistic
model, posterior probabilities are shown as color maps as functions of λ (abscissa) and δtevolve (ordinate). At each horizontal
cut across the PDF plots (left column), the values integrate to unity, as expected for a proper probability density function. For
short values of δtevolve, the selection effect (that intelligent creatures take some time to evolve) is unimportant, and the data
might be somewhat informative about the true distribution of λ. For larger values of δtevolve, the selection effect becomes more
important, to the point that the probability of the data given λ approaches 1, and the posterior probability approaches the
prior.
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Fig. 1. PDF (left) and CDF (right) of λ for uniform, logarithmic, and inverse-uniform priors, for models Hypothetical (top), Optimistic (middle),
Conservative (bottom). Curves are shown for priors with λmin = 10
−22Gyr−1, λmin = 10−11Gyr−1, and λmin = 10−3Gyr−1. The uniform and
inverse-uniform priors lead to CDFs that are completely insensitive to the data for all three models; for the Conservative model, even the logarithmic prior is insesnsitive
to the data.
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Fig. 4. PDF (left) and CDF (right) of λ for uniform, logarithmic, an i rse-uniform priors, for models Hypothetical (top), Optimistic (middle),
Conservative (bottom). Curves are shown for priors with λmin = 10
22 yr−1, λmin = 10−11Gyr−1, and λmin = 10 3Gyr−1. The uniform and
inverse-uniform priors lead to CDFs that are completely insensitive to the data for all three models; for the Conservative model, even the logarithmic prior is insesnsitive
to the data.
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Fig. 2. The influence of δtevolve. Uniform prior (top), logarithmic prior (middle), and inverse-uniform prior (bottom). PDF (left) and CDF (right). Aside from
δtevolve, parameters are set to the Optimistic model with λmin = 10−3Gyr−1 in the logarithmic and inverse-uniform cases.
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Fig. 5. The influence of δtevolve. Uniform prior (top), logarithmic prior ( i le), and inverse-uniform prior (bottom). PDF (left) and CDF (right). Aside from
δtevolve, param ters are set to the Optimistic model with λmin = 10
−3 yr 1 in the logarithmic and inverse-uniform cases.
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